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This paper inductively derives a model that develops the concept of subsidiary embeddedness as 
the framework within which subsidiary strategy can take place. Our model identifies three 
hierarchical levels of embeddedness. Operational embeddedness relates to interlocking day-to-
day relations. Capability embeddedness deals with the development of competitive capabilities 
for the multinational as a whole. Strategic embeddedness deals with subsidiary participation in 
the MNC strategy setting. We deem these three types of embeddedness as ways to develop 
subsidiary strategic alternatives. As such, different types of subsidiary embeddedness imply 
different subsidiary roles. Embeddedness, as we inductively concluded from a revealing case 
study, is not merely an outcome of institutional setting, but a resource which a subsidiary can 
manage by means of manipulating dependencies or exerting influence over the allocation of 
critical resources. A subsidiary can modify its embeddedness to change its strategic restraints. 
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Theory and research have suggested that subsidiaries may develop strategy alongside their 
evolution (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Taggart, 1999; Andersson, Björkman and Forsgren, 
2002). At the same time, embeddedness of any firm in its business network has significant 
implications for its performance (Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990; Uzzi, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Håkansson and Snehota, 1998; Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 2000; Rowley, Behrens and 
Krackhardt, 2000; Hung, 2002). In fact, embeddedness is a good predictor of the role a 
subsidiary may play in the overall Multinational Corporation (MNC) network (Andersson and 
Forsgren, 1996) and the subsidiary's local embeddedness partially explains subsidiary 
knowledge creation (Taggart and Hood, 1999; Andersson, Björkman and Forsgren, 2005). 
Subsidiaries, however, have more constraints in developing their own strategy given that they 
are embedded in different networks that include all other units of the multinational to which 
they belong, alongside customers, suppliers and other institutions. Moreover, they typically 
have a pre-set business domain that limits their possible strategy (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). 
Inspite of subsidiaries face corporate and resource constraints, and the establishment of lateral 
relations between MNC units (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995), they actually have space to 
define their own mission and goals, and look after their own future (Birkinshaw and Hood, 
1998), which influences performance (Subramaniam and Watson, 2006). Nevertheless, the 
process whereby and the extent to which subsidiaries develop their own strategy via 
embeddedness has been given less attention. 
This paper uses the notion of embeddedness to inductively develop a model that contributes to 
the literature on subsidiary strategy (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). The contribution of this 
paper is to present a model that uses the very embeddedness of the subsidiary as the key driver 
of subsidiary distinctiveness. We consider distinctiveness an integral part of subsidiary strategy, 
as it builds the subsidiary’s raison d’être within the multinational network (Ghoshal and 
Bartlett, 1990). Our purpose is to inductively build a theory that links subsidiary embeddedness 
and subsidiary distinctiveness, explaining how the process of developing its distinctiveness 
depends on the nature of its embeddedness. We fulfill this purpose through a single 
longitudinal case study of an automobil components manufacture subsidiary. 
   
2 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
A Preview of the Model 
We argue that the subsidiary embeddedness in the MNC is the basis on which its strategy can 
be developed, and that the level and type of embeddedness of the subsidiary is a constraint 
on its ability to develop strategy as it limits its initiative potential. Our focus in this paper is 
not on the local embeddedness of the subsidiary but on its mirror image, the embeddedness of 
the subsidiary in the MNC. As our case data shows, the level of subsidiary embeddedness in the 
MNC accounts for the capacity of the subsidiary to have its own strategy. We develop this 
argument into a theoretical model presented in Figure 1. Subsidiary embeddedness becomes 
then an integral part of strategy, as the subsidiary has to eliminate or manage the constraints in 
order to develop its own strategy. 
 
Figure 1 









Subsidiaries are paramount to Multinational Corporations’ (MNCs) performance. Our central 
argument is that subsidiary strategy can be traced back to its embeddedness consequences, and 
we argue that the subsidiary’s strategy will be possible only if built on its embeddedness. The 
study of their contribution to the overall MNC has evolved from a merely passive 
implementation of head office mandates, towards a more proactive and initiative-taking 
strategy (Prahalad and Doz, 1981; Hedlund, 1986; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Birkinshaw, 
1997; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Taggart, 1999; Andersson et al., 2002; Birkinshaw, Hood 
and Young, 2005). Underlying this pattern of research is the prevailing idea that subsidiaries 
may develop their own strategy by means of two alternatives. On the one hand, the subsidiary 
may simply fulfill the responsibilities that come from a specific role assigned by headquarters 
(HQ). Subsidiary strategy may be allocated a subsidiary role (Jarillo and Martínez, 1990). On the 
other hand, subsidiaries may develop as sources of an MNC’s competitive advantage and 
providers of strategic initiatives, following a more autonomous behavioral pattern (Burgelman, 
1983). Subsidiary strategy may then be associated with initiative-taking (Birkinshaw and Hood, 
1998; Taggart, 1999; Delany, 2000). Therefore, subsidiary strategy can be seen as a complex 
balance between HQ’s mandate and autonomous behavior. We view subsidiaries as balancing 
these requirements in as much as they manage embeddedness. In line with Nohria and Ghoshal 
(1997), we view MNCs as a network of embedded differentiated members. Building on 
Granovetter (1985) we use embeddedness as the network of relations with other units of the 
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The model presented in this paper has four interlinked main elements (see Figure 1). The first 
element is headquarters’ (HQs) mandate, which is exogenous to the model. It may vary from a 
constrained mandate to a more open guideline shaping the subsidiary’s behavior. Second, the 
autonomous behavior of the subsidiary, which depends on the restrictions set by the mandate. 
The more leeway the mandate leaves, the more the subsidiary will develop autonomous 
behavior. Via this behavior the subsidiary can develop embeddedness, which is the capacity of 
the subsidiary to develop social action, which in turn helps the development of subsidiary 
strategy. Third, the levels of embeddedness the subsidiary develops through its autonomous 
behavior. The resulting three levels of embeddedness in ascending order are operational, 
capability and strategic according to the level of social action achieved. Finally, subsidiary 
distinctiveness is the outcome variable of the level of embeddedness. Achieving distinctiveness 
within the MNC contributes to the subsidiary survival and fosters its development. The extent 
to which distinctiveness is accepted by the MNC’s HQ will feed back into the subsidiary’s 
autonomous behavior. 
The development of a subsidiary named Brakes Spain, using a case study and network analysis, 
provides support to develop this inductive model. Due to the delicate nature of the data the 
names have been disguised. From the case data, we suggest that the subsidiary can manipulate 
embeddedness as part of its strategy, as it can manipulate other resources. Embeddedness is not 
only determined by the external factors surrounding the subsidiary, but can also be seen as the 
result of the autonomous efforts of the subsidiary to stand out for adding value to the overall 
MNC. The three dimensions of embeddedness proposed here, which the subsidiary can effect in 
order to increase its strategic importance, are explained next: 
Operational embeddedness is viewed here as the set of relations between the subsidiary and 
other units of the MNC that concern day-to-day activities. Coordination of worldwide 
manufacturing or product launch gives rise to a network of relations across the MNC whose 
aim is to keep operational day-to-day activities afloat.  
Capability embeddedness is viewed here as the set of relations that comprise the development of 
strategic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). Benchmarking, best practices or 
knowledge management efforts highlight the competitive proficiency of certain units. The 
diffusion of these practices generates a network of relationships among operating units. The 
more the subsidiary develops these strategic capabilities, the higher the chances of being called 
to contribute. Overall knowledge management processes will integrate the best actors within the 
subsidiary to contribute to the different strategic capabilities of the multinational.  
Strategic embeddedness is viewed here as the set of relations between the subsidiary and other 
units of the MNC that relate to the subsidiary’s participation in the overall strategy of the MNC. 
Active participation of subsidiary members in the strategy process may influence the overall 
MNC’s strategy through a group of relations generated from the subsidiary. The more 
participation there is in the strategic process of the MNC, the more dependencies will be 
encouraged among the different units in the MNC, and the higher the level of strategic 
embeddedness.  
The proposed model posits an active and important role of subsidiaries in breeding relationships 
with other members of the MNC. The content of these relationships may range from an 
operational nature, through capability content all the way to a more strategic character. 
However, it can also go into a decline in the opposite direction losing either strategic or 
capability embeddedness due to subsidiary inaction or change in HQ’s mandated constraints.   
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section will introduce the research 
settings and describe the methods and sources of data. Then we take the reader through the 
story of the company introducing both qualitative and quantitative data, by virtue of which we 
develop the theoretical model. Finally, in the last section, we discuss the limitations of our 
approach, including the relevant boundary conditions, and highlight implications of the model 
for future MNC research. 
METHODS 
This study can better be understood as inductive theory building. We have used a single case 
study design to study evolution of subsidiary strategy over a ten-year period. The four sources 
of data, including one quantitative, are presented in Table 1. Informal interactions coupled with 
participative observation provided the bulk data to construct the story. Participant observation 
accounts were the result of one author’s collaboration with the company studied. This type of 
data offered depth towards understanding the genesis of strategic behavior in Brakes Spain. In 
2003, a second author of this paper collected his qualitative data through interviews in order to 
be able to cross check the first author's interpretation. We also collected network data and 
carried out semi-structured interviews in 1998 and 2003. A detailed account of this process 
together with the research setting follows. 
Table 1 
Sources of Data 
  Interviews
 a    Measurement of Social Network 
c    Participant 
Observation 
e 
  Archival Documents 
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1.315 232  280 
 
Top Management 
- Planning  meeting 
- Budgeting  meetings   
- Brainstorming 
sessions 
- Assessment  and 
reporting meetings  
   
- Strategic  objectives 
- Organizational  change 
plan 
-  Industry studies  
- Historic  company 
records 
1998  37 22 15 18     50    




734 322  355    Middle Management 
- Objective  setting 
meetings 
- Budgeting  meetings   





  -  Summaries of strategy 
meetings  
- Communication  records 
with HQ 
- Strategic  Plans 
Total 68  45  23  23 
b           Total 35 
a Data collection included 68 in-depth one to two hour open-ended, in-person interviews with managers of levels 1,2,3 and 4 from the studied organization. These included two interviews each 
time with each of the three subsidiary CEOs. In 2003, two of these CEOs had left the company, but were still interviewed. Other interviewees were: Plant Managers 1 and 2, Head of Purchasing, 
Product Testing Manager, Chief Engineering Officer, Human Resources Manager, Client 1 Account Manager, Application Engineering Liaison, Controller Brakes, Spain Quality Manager Purchasing 
Manager, Product Testing Manager. 
b 5 interviewees, not present in 1998, were interviewed in 2003. 
 
c The Social Network was measured in 1998 and 2003; both times via a questionnaire that measured work-based relationships as long term patterns of interaction (Freeman, Romney and Freeman, 
1987). Questions specifically asked separately for relations with the subsidiary (internal), with the MNC (corporate) and with suppliers or clients (external) (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982). The sample 
was selected using a “reputational approach” (Scott, 1991), where information about the actors with higher level of reputation in the set is considered enough to determine the networks of 
relations of a set. Sampling was required due to both the natural inability of respondents to complement a massive questionnaire and the computational limitations of any network software. 
 
d Evident mismatches and incomplete entries were eliminated resulting in 99.2% of usable data for 1998 and 2003. 
e Participant observation was carried out from 1993 to 2003. Through this ten-year period the frequency of interaction ranged from weekly to monthly. These observations were characterized by 
informal interactions, visits to the company and participation in meetings.  
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Research Setting 
Brakes Spain, a subsidiary of British, and managed via its Brakes Division, is the critical case 
used to inductively develop theory in the present paper. Brakes Spain has undergone an 
organic process built around the growth and decline of valuable and distinctive resources as 
illustrated in Birkinshaw and Hood (1998). For this reason, we have chosen it as a revelatory 
case. Using existing theorization in subsidiary evolution we have inductively developed the 
theoretical model set forth in the present paper. 
British is a diversified MNC, active in more than 30 countries across Europe, America and Asia. 
Brakes Spain belongs to the brake division within the automotive business, Brakes, a world 
leader with more than 25 percent volume world market share. Brakes Division is British’s 
largest business and most of the leading vehicle manufacturers utilize their components, 
operating in 20 countries. Active R&D is a key element for Brakes Division due to the limited 
number of customers. Concentration and consolidation of the vehicle manufacturers (Womack, 
Jones and Roos, 1991) has limited the number of customers for British worldwide.  
Turnover of Brakes Spain was in the region of €350 million in 2001, operating two plants with 
1,800 employees. Amongst all Brakes subsidiaries, the Spanish one stands out for three reasons. 
First, Brakes Spain has been consistently the best performing subsidiary in the Brakes Division, 
showing the highest return on sales, as well as high flexibility and productivity. Second, all 
customers’ decision centers are located outside Spain, leaving Spain in a disadvantageous 
position compared to other subsidiaries. This forces Brakes Spain to be especially active in 
developing its position within the global market and across the MNC. Third and foremost, 
Brakes Spain has been not only a net cash contributor but also a source of strategic initiatives 
and capability development for the Brakes Division. As such, Brakes Spain has grown to be a 
unit of high strategic importance to the MNC.  
Data Collection 
Participant Observation: Our involvement with the studied company began in 1993 when one 
of the authors was invited to take part in a meeting at Brakes Spain. The objective was to 
review the company’s situation and develop a detailed plan for implementing the desired 
changes. From then until 2003, regular contact with Brakes Spain was maintained at several 
levels. This included informal interaction, meetings and discussions with managers throughout 
the company. Participant observation aimed at facilitating strategy formation within Brakes 
Spain. Regular written notes provided a key resource as a mean of narrating the story. Informal 
interactions and meetings varied in frequency from weekly to monthly. Weekly interactions 
took place  with  contacts across hierarchical levels, from factory foremen through managers to 
the CEO.  The main monthly interactions took place with Brakes Spain’s top management. For 
certain periods of time, there was also frequent interaction with four divisional level managers. 
Interacting regularly with managers and operational personnel provided data which are not 
commonly available, and became the basis for narrating the story and articulating the 
theoretical links that explain it.  
Interviews: In parallel, and to gain further and formal understanding of the strategic evolution 
of the subsidiary, 31 in-depth interviews were carried out in 2003 and 37 in 1998. These 
interviews took place from March to December 2003 and March to August 1998. On both  
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occasions, interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hour, and detailed notes were taken. On 
both occasions, a protocol was followed as guidance for the sequence of steps to follow and 
themes to cover aiming at reliability (Yin, 1994). The interviewees were key officers who had a 
role in the evolution of the subsidiary strategy, as shown in Table 1. We interviewed 23 
managers directly involved with the formulation and implementation of Brakes Spain’s 
strategy. Two researchers were involved in developing the interviews to avoid biased 
interpretation and to assure coverage of all relevant issues. Throughout the data collection and 
analysis process, we aimed at internal validity, looking for alternative explanations between the 
two researchers (Yin, 1994). After each round of interviews, the authors had critical discussions  
to validate interpretation (Silverman, 2001). Whenever disagreement arose it was sorted out by 
making a phone call to specific interviewees. This entire process aimed at maintaining 
reliability and internal validity during qualitative data collection.  
Archival data: This included the following documents: first, strategic and organizational 
documents, at both national and divisional level; second, organizational charts and 
organizational change plans; third, industry studies and competition reports that analyzed the 
position of Brakes Spain; fourth, advice and communication records with external consultants; 
fifth, presentations and communications records with HQ and other business units, as well as 
historic records of the relationship with customers. These documents were key in cross-checking 
with the other sources of data.  
Social Network Analysis: Our aim was to determine the work-based pattern of relationships 
that start at the units that make up Brakes Spain, both internally and externally. We included 
every relevant player within the firm in the sampling . The sampling method was the 
“reputational approach” (Scott, 1991), where obtaining information about the actors with 
the higher level of reputation in a particular set of actors is enough to determine the network of 
relations of that set. This criterion proved useful at Brakes Spain, where managers are the 
actors with the best knowledge of which agents enjoy the highest level of reputation in 
the company. Yet, to avoid “hierarchy bias” (tendency to select one’s subordinates as enjoying 
high reputation), the researchers turned to the authors’ knowledge of the firm and its 
employees, and selected those with higher levels of reputation among their peers. The final list 
was compared to a different one compiled by Brakes Spain’s Human Resources Manager, 
adding or deleting members based on a discussion about his/her actual level of reputation. As a 
result of this process, 50 managers were selected in 1998 and 84 in 2003. Questionnaires were 
handed out in the first wave and administered online in the second wave. Questions were 
formatted in a free-recall and fixed-choice design to allow respondents to name any actor 
belonging to any unit in Brakes Spain or the MNC with whom he or she had interacted at work 
in the last six months. Response rates were 95% and 96%, for 1998 and 2003, respectively. In 
both instances, personal calls were made to individuals who were reluctant to respond at first. 
In both cases a presentation of aggregate network results was made to different units within the 
company, which also helped to clarify our interpretation of the results. 
Data Analysis and Reduction 
Combining participant observation, interview, archival and network data allowed us to 
understand, not only the relationships between entities, but also the content of those 
relationships. The analyses of qualitative and quantitative data were carried out separately and 
hence they are presented next. Both types of data were linked after the analysis to develop our 
theoretical model.  
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Qualitative data: We used various sources of data to develop the Brakes Spain case. For 
consistency, we triangulated the information obtained through the interviews with the 
longitudinal database derived from our involvement with the company and the access to 
archival data (Yin, 1994). To make sense of such a vast amount of data, we focused on 
constructing the story making use of narrative to consolidate our understanding. Based on the 
record of participants observation, the two sets of interviews and archival data, the story was 
written, including the logical links between events. Use of narrative is useful to reduce large 
amounts of data into a coherent unit (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Pentland, 1999; Silverman, 
2001). Interviews and records of participant observation were organized into a sequential 
timeline matrix (Miles and Huberman, 1994). We classified each segment into one of three time 
categories, namely, 1993-1998, 1998-2002 and 2002-2003. Next, we devised a written 
document that logically collated each segment within each time category. Successive iteration, 
between the matrix and the text, and cross-checking with archival data produced a 34 page 
draft reporting the story of Brakes Spain. Aiming at reliability, we pursued authentication of 
the written case by two independent consultants from Brakes Spain (Yin, 1994). They read, 
revised, and validated the narrative. After a few minor modifications the case in narrative form 
was deemed an accurate description of the events occurring in Brakes Spain from 1993-2003. 
A version of this narrative is presented in the present paper. The analysis that logically links 
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Network Analysis: The issue which recurred most during our interaction with managers was 
the idea that Brakes Spain was losing contact with different counterparts of the business (other 
units of the MNC, units of the subsidiary itself, and clients) during the period of study. In order 
to validate this claim, we performed a network analysis of the relationships starting at Brakes 
Spain and oriented towards an ‘outside’ sphere, namely, customers, other operating units within 
the division and the divisional headquarters. The network was measured in 1998 and in 2003. 
Structural variables (Wasserman and Faust, 1999) were measured as work-based interactions. 
Here, we studied actors from two different sets tied by a work-based relationship, one 
consisting of a sample of employees at Brakes Spain, and a second larger set consisting of 
employees of the same company plus employees of other units of the MNC, as cited by the 
interviewees. Actors in the first set are “senders” of the relation (egos), while those in the other 
set are “receivers” (alters). The second set is opened to who ever senders mention. The resulting 
network is one made up by ties surrounding the sampled individual units, which can be 
separated into three more concrete networks. First, the Internal Network made by the 
relationships between and across units of Brakes Spain. Second, the Corporate Network made 
by the relations of Brakes Spain with alters, who are members of the MNC. Third, the External 
Network formed with customers and suppliers. An illustration of these appears in Figure 2. The 
Internal Network shows the relationships among units within the subsidiary, plant departments 
or local headquarters departments. The Corporate Network is a two-mode network showing the 
relationships of the departments within the subsidiary with different departments in other MNC 
units, including Brakes’ division headquarters.  The resulting network analysis produced a final 
database of 1,411 pairs of ego and alter tied by work-based relation entries in 1998 and 1,827 
entries in 2003. This was divided into Internal, Corporate and External Networks as can be seen 
in Table 3. We performed the analysis at the aggregate functional level since we were interested 
in the relationships between functions rather than between individuals. Next, data were 
analyzed on cross-tabs, each cell representing the frequency of work-based interactions 
between ego and alter. To identify the differences between the two networks we calculated the 
proportion of relations in each network to subsequently test if their differences were significant. 
The results of such calculations can be seen in Table 3. In addition, we block modeled the two 
mode Networks (Borgatti and Everett, 1997) and calculated centrality and density measures for 
the External Network as can be seen in Table 4. All calculations were done using UCINET 
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Table 3 
Evolution of Relations in Brakes Spain 
  1998
 a   2003
 a   1998  vs.  2003
b 
  Number of Relations  1 ˆ p     Number of Relations  2 ˆ p    
2 1 ˆ ˆ p p ≠  
All Ego-Alter Relations (I,II & III)  1,183 1    1705 1     
I. Internal Network: Operational  









   
(+) **** 
  1) HQ Spain-Plants   106  0.09    185 0.11    (+) 
  2) Plants-HQ Spain  78  0.07    103 0.06    (-) 
  3) HQ Spain-HQ Spain  322  0.27    408 0.24    (-) 
  4) Plants-Plants  228  0.19    619 0.36    (+) **** 
II. Corporate Network: Operational 













  1) HQ Spain-MNC Plants   156  0.13    136 0.08    (-) **** 
  2) HQ Spain-MNC HQ  118  0.10    89 0.05    (-) **** 
  3) Plants Spain-MNC HQ  39  0.03    14 0.01    (-) **** 
  4) Plants Spain-MNC Plants  12  0.01    53 0.03    (+) *** 
III. External Network: Operational   











  1) HQ Spain-Clients  114  0.10    58 0.03    (-) **** 
  2) Plants Spain-Clients  12  0.01    40 0.03    (+) ** 
 
a  1 ˆ p and  2 ˆ p  are the proportions of the total relationships in the category. 
b Significance of difference of proportions has been calculated using a normal distribution. 
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Table 4  
Corporate Nertwork Brakes Spain towards Brakers: 

































    1998    2003 
Two- mode network density   0.196    0.156 
Block Modeling 1998 
  Brakes  Division   
  A B   
  X Group (Brakes Spain actors): HQ-Product Engineering, HQ-Marketing and Sales, HQ-
Research and Development, HQ-Purchasing. Plant Process Engineering 
Brakes  
X 1 1 
Y Group (Brakes Spain actors): HQ-Testing, HQ-Controlling, HQ-Purchasing, Plant 
Quality, Plant Purchasing, Plant Controlling, Plant General Management, Plant 
Manufacturing, Plant Human Resources, HQ-Quality. 
Spain 
Y 0 0 
A Group (Brakes actors): HQ-Product Engineering, HQ-Research and Development, HQ- 
Manufacturing, HQ-Purchasing, HQ-Product Engineering. Plant Product Engineering, 
Plant Purchasing. 
B Group MNC (Brakes actors): HQ-Marketing and Sales, HQ-Testing, HQ-Human 
Resources, HQ-Control, HQ-General Management, HQ-Quality, HQ-Product Engineering. 
Plant Quality, Plant Controlling, Plant General Management, Plant Testing, Plant 
Research and Development, Plant Process Engineering, Plant Logistics.  
 
Block Modeling 2003 
 
  Brakes  Division   
  A  B   
  X Group (Brakes Spain actors):HQ- Product Engineering, HQ-Marketing and Sales, HQ-
Research and Development, HQ-Testing, HQ-Quality, Plant Quality, Plant Process 
Engineering. 
Brakes  
X 1 0 Y Group (Brakes Spain actors): HQ-Controlling, HQ-Human Resources, HQ-General 
Management, 
HQ-, Purchasing, Plant General Management, Plant Manufacturing, Plant Human 
Resources, Plant Controlling, Plant Logistics. 
Spain 
Y 0 0 
A Group (Brakes actors): Plant Quality, Plant Marketing and Sales, Plant Product 
engineering, Plant Process Engineering. 
B Group (Brakes actors): HQ-Quality, HQ-Marketing and Sales, HQ-Purchasing, HQ- 
Controlling, HQ-General Management, HQ-Testing, HQ-Human resources, HQ-Research 
and Development,  
HQ Engineering, Plant Controlling, Plant Testing, Plant manufacturing, Plant general 
management, Plant Human Resources, Plant Research and Development, Plant 
Logistics. 
For the Brakes divisional level actors, plant departments have been consolidated. For instance, Plant Quality is the aggregation 
of all quality departments of Brakes plants around the world consolidated as one single actor. 
Brakes Spain Towards Brakes: Density Matrices per Block   
 
1998  2003 
 A  B      A  B 
X 0.722  0.234    X  0.515 0.149 
Y 0.169  0.098    Y  0.070 0.096 
           
Number of alter per year  
  1998  
    2003   
XA XB  Total    XA  XB Total 
HQ  Plant  HQ  Plant  HQ  Plant    HQ  Plant  HQ  Plant  HQ  Plant 
5  2 7 7  12  9    0 4 9 7 9  11 
To be read: In 1998, the number of departments from Brakes division headquarters to which actors in 
Block X from Brakes Spain were related, was 5.  
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Figure 2 
Network Evolution 
   1998       2003   
Internal Network  
 
 
Corporate Network: Two-mode network representation where MNC’s functions are one dimension 
and subsidiary functions are the second dimension. Squares represent MNC’s functions and circles 




BRAKES SPAIN: THE HISTORY OF ITS STRATEGY 
The story of Brakes Spain is one of a regular subsidiary that was able to gain significance in 
the strategic development of its mother company. However, Brakes Spain's strategic importance 
was jeopardized as the MNC centralized key activities. From 1993 to 2003 Brakes Spain 
suffered initially a rise and then a decline in its strategic importance. Firstly, Brakes Spain 
moved from being a mere plant to becoming a strategic player within the global company. 
Then, it started to lose strategic relevance in such a way that its managers perceived the 
subsidiary was going back to its mere operating role within the MNC. We summarized this story 
into three different stages or time categories that we have called: Obeying Orders, Gaining 
Fitness and Losing Ground. 
I: Obeying Orders  
Prior to 1998, the business strategy of the MNC British had been one of optimizing operations, 
reducing costs and minimizing delivery time in a globalized marketplace. The globalization  
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process carried out by the MNC had led Brakes Spain to a situation where its customers’ 
decision centers were dispersed worldwide far from its national operations. Moreover, by 1993, 
Brakes Spain had few local customers and neither proprietary technology nor a team to 
develop it. This situation stood as a clear disadvantage vis-à-vis other European subsidiaries, 
which either had relationships with local customers or enough R&D to cope with developing 
new products. Managers of Brakes Spain felt its manufacturing operation was a candidate for 
relocation to a lower labor cost country. In order to overcome this dismal future, the subsidiary 
decided to design a strategy that allowed Brakes Spain to gain distinctiveness within the 
division. The subsidiary’s CEO summarized this notion as:  
“If we were to avoid the plant’s relocation, something that was happening to other plants 
of the group, it was vital for Brakes Spain to be able to add value to the MNC; we 
decided to transform our unit in order to make it able to make a greater contribution to 
the division; we wanted to base our prestige in efficiency, the best manufacturing and 
high flexibility.” 
The strategy designed to overcome the ‘Obey Orders Stage’ was based upon three pillars. First, 
the development of a strong local HQ in order to improve coordination and knowledge 
transmission among plants. Fulfilling this function, Brakes Spain expected to serve as a filter 
between its plants and other units of the MNC. Second, they invested in R&D subsidiary 
capabilities, giving emphasis to the engineering department. Several young engineers were 
recruited with the objective of generating novel manufacturing processes, more efficient plant 
layout designs, and better product applications. This investment was also expected to indirectly 
give Brakes Spain a better position compared to similar units in countries such as France and 
Germany. Should this plan work, Brakes Spain would be able to establish immediate and fluid 
relationships with both the engineering departments of other units of the MNC and those of its 
clients. Finally, the strategy aimed at developing the sales department, in order to bring 
customers closer to Brakes Spain. 
In order to compensate for their dull geographic position, Brakes Spain decided to push its sales 
department to develop the Asian market, hiring international and well-prepared managers who 
could be in direct touch with customers and engineers of other units of the MNC. They decided 
to push the production department and their plant managers in order to bargain internally 
within the MNC to acquire projects and products. 
The overall strategy was brought up by the subsidiary, in the form of a suggestion, to the 
divisional head. The argument used was that the integration of the subsidiary within the group 
activities, being closer to the customer and the division, would allow Brakes Spain to produce 
faster, respond quicker and add more value to the division as a whole. Nevertheless, the process 
followed to gain the division’s authorization was quite eclectic. In words of the 1993-1998 CEO:  
 “…Sometimes you negotiate these things with head office, some they grant and some 
they don’t… sometimes you just don’t make a proposal, you simply act and head office 
endorses it after the fact” 
The results of the implemented strategy were evident in 1998, when, as a consequence of sound 
management by the CEO of Brakes Spain he was promoted to a higher position within the 
MNC. Additional results attributed to this strategy determined the second stage of Brakes 
Spain’s strategy.  
14 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
II. Gaining Fitness 
By 1998, Brakes Spain had turned the previous situation around. With a share of 11% of total 
MNC’s turnover, it was the largest subsidiary of the Brakes Division in terms of cash flow 
contribution to the division. During the 1998-2002 period, several managers from the Spanish 
subsidiary were promoted to divisional functions and responsibilities. This reveals the 
contribution potential of the unit within the MNC. Managers’ promotions were driven by the 
perception at Brakes Division that Brakes Spain had become more capable of contributing 
strategically to the global organization, due to its managers’ expertise in operations and 
business processes. For example, Brakes Spain was able to put a prototype into mass 
production in record time. What was more, from the selling perspective, customers from distant 
countries such as the U.S. or Japan would specifically asked to be served by Brakes Spain. 
Similarly, after a global benchmark process, the MNC decided to clone the task forces model 
designed by Brakes Spain across the rest of the subsidiaries to launch new products. 
Furthermore, the MNC decided to ‘translate’ the layout designs developed by Brakes Spain to 
the U.S. Additionally, after negotiating with the Brakes Division, plant managers at Brakes 
Spain were able to gain for the Spanish subsidiary the production of certain parts that were 
turned down by other units of the MNC. This negotiation left Brakes Spain specialized and 
responsible of the production of high-margin brakes-system parts within the group.  
In sum, Brakes Spain achieved a high reputation across the MNC based upon its manufacturing 
excellence, its best selling team, its flexibility at launching new products, its well-known 
engineering team and the fact of being the largest subsidiary of Brakes in terms of net cash 
contribution. Consider, for instance, the effect that Brakes Spain had on HQ via its involvement 
in the Asian expansion strategy. In different European meetings, HQ declared the importance of 
serving Asian customers. However, none of the MNC subsidiaries felt confident enough to 
overcome problems derived from cultural and language differences and geographic distance. At 
a certain point in time, the strategy of expanding to Asia seemed impossible. Nevertheless, 
Brakes Spain pushed its commercial department harder and was able to start projects with one 
client in Japan and one in Korea, which was the first step to making the Asian expansion 
feasible. 
The strategy proposed in 1999 at Brakes Spain aimed to keep and strengthen the advantageous 
position achieved. It focused on keeping the state-of-the-art organization and mass production 
techniques, but added a search for excellence in engineering, to strengthen the identity of the 
plants, foster good relationships with the workers as well as develop international executives 
who could aspire to positions at Brakes Division. More than anything else the strategy 
strengthened their R&D department by looking for recognition within the group while helping 
develop the Asian expansion. Nevertheless, the future was going to prove different to that 
intended. 
III. Losing Ground 
The key change occurred by mid-1998, when a new divisional head was appointed, with 
subsequent repercussions. His main self-imposed strategic goal was to attack the Asian market 
through the European operations given their level of technology, efficiency, reliability and 
geographical location (closer than the U.S., for example). Meanwhile, from the divisional 
viewpoint of Brakes, it was thought that, in order to achieve this goal, a higher level of 
centralization was needed. Consequently, by 2002 purchasing, new product launches,  
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engineering applications processes and sales activities were centralized. Additionally, the 
division also imposed a certain level of rationalization at the manufacturing level, trying to 
leverage specialization of plants. The argued rationale behind these decisions was to keep 
control over key business activities, to better coordinate R&D investment among units and to 
obtain lower manufacturing costs.  
This set of measures scaled back the relationships that Brakes Spain had established with 
customers, as well as with other units of the multinational. The consequences damaged Brakes 
Spain’s autonomous strategic behavior. As global managers and functions were established, 
local managers and functions started to vanish. Key decisions started to be taken by global 
managers and only low-level decisions were kept in-country. For instance, under the new 
structure, Brakes Spain was not allowed to contact a customer directly when the customer 
decided to include a small change in the design of a new product or application. That function 
was now the responsibility of the new Global Account Manager, who, in turn, had to 
coordinate with global project leaders. Apart from losing contact with customers and managers 
from other units of the MNC, Brakes Spain’s field was forced to narrow its strategy towards the 
achievement of operational excellence. The strong pressure to reduce headcount was unheard of 
in an organization that had always been focused on customer strategy and growth. In the 
aftermath, the strategic role played by Brakes Spain vanished under centralized activities such 
as marketing, sales, new product launches and R&D. In the words of the 2002-2003 CEO:  
“A great part of our reputation within the group was due to our closeness to the customer 
and the flexibility of our product launching teams. From 2000, when European 
representatives were appointed to these activities, it is they who were to address the 
customer, while we could barely reach the customer directly…now we do not control the 
business and we have gone back to pre-1998: we are simply manufacturing plants.” 
A MODEL OF SUBSIDIARY STRATEGY AS EMBEDDEDNESS 
The story of Brakes Spain shows the transition of a marginal unit that shaped its destiny. It did 
so by taking an active role in building valuable relationships. The subsidiary managers had 
decided to design a strategy that allowed the unit to gain distinctiveness within the MNC. 
However, a constraining level of centralization promoted at divisional level in mid-2000 
reduced the strategic space that Brakes Spain had enjoyed. It lost its level of autonomy through 
the centralization of resources and decisions, which counterbalanced the subsidiary’s attempts 
to govern its future. 
Underlying this process is a change in the network of relationships from Brakes Spain towards 
other units of the MNC and its clients. First, it responded to operational integration by 
developing a network of relations, generating Operational Embeddedness. Second, it leveraged 
its operational efficiencies into distinctive capabilities establishing relations across the MNC, 
generating Capability Embeddedness. These capabilities, in turn, helped to develop a strategic 
role, as Brakes Spain championed new markets and developed new products and processes 
copied across the MNC, reaching Strategic Embeddedness. In the last stage, they lost control 
over key business processes through centralized key activities and went back to Operational 
Embeddedness. Each embeddedness type was built on the previous one. Next, we will describe 
each of the constructs that make the theoretical model proposed that emerged from the study 
data as shown in Figure 1.  
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Operational Embeddedness 
By operational embeddedness we mean the set of relations between Brakes Spain and the rest of 
the MNC that involve operational and manufacturing activities. As can be seen in Table 2, for 
Stage I, the subsidiary concentrated in developing efficiencies in operation, manufacturing and 
coordination amongst plants. In a similar fashion towards the end of this study, operational 
embeddedness was prevailing. This is reflected in the significance of the relationships among 
Spanish plants (36% of all the relations) and the increased significance of the relations between 
the Spanish plants and those of the customers (3% of all relations) (See Table 3). Operational 
embeddedness is highlighted in table 4 as most of the relations appearing in the only non-zero 
block in 2003 are towards units in other divisional plants (block density = 0.515). As the data in 
this study suggests, operational embeddedness implies more relationships among plants within 
the division and a lower level of relations between local HQ and divisional HQ. 
Capability Embeddedness 
Capability embeddedness is the set of relationships resulting from efforts to further develop 
MNC’s strategic capabilities. Brakes Spain was first able to develop operational embeddedness 
through its increasing participation both in best-practice transfer from Brakes Spain, and its 
participation in general best-practice workgroups within the MNC. Best-Practice transfers were 
informally developed by Brakes Spain by sharing their know-how. Work group relations 
emerged as other units in the MNC asked for them. Next, the subsidiary was able to develop its 
own capability in product development through recruitment of R&D and engineering staff. 
Coupled with development, they built a sales department that would work in tandem with R&D 
and Engineering, catering to specific customer requirements. This structure, together with 
manufacturing excellence, increased its position to capability embeddedness as shown by the 
data in Table 2. This observation is supported by the network measurement in 1998 of a high 
number of interactions between Brakes Spain and customers, as shown in Table 3.  
The non-zero value of the XB block  in the 1998 block model highlights the existence of 
relationships between Brakes Spain and different departments in Brakes Division, both at the 
plant and the HQ level. The fact that all those relations came from the Brakes Spain head office 
illustrates how those were purposefully managed by top management in Brakes Spain’s head 
office (see table 4). Through this process Brakes Spain became an integral part of strategic 
capability development in the division. 
Strategic Embeddedness 
By strategic embeddedness we mean the set of relations that Brakes Spain established with 
other units of the MNC and with Brakes Division. The fact that Brakes Spain had consistently 
good performance within Brakes, had developed distinctive capabilities and gained customer 
recognition, made them a significant player within the MNC. They were perceived as a set of 
skillful executives who had transformed their organization (see Table 2). Their intention of 
developing a distinctive character to avoid being relocated had reached fruition when their 
structure to serve customers was copied across the MNC, but more importantly when they acted 
as the flagship to break into the Asian market. This pattern is also shown by the social network 
analysis. Table 4 shows that the number of alters in 1998 was higher among Brakes’ HQ  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 17 
departments than among other subsidiaries’ departments. Their relations with the MNC at the 
level of HQ and Plants were significantly higher in 1998 as shown in Table 3. Moreover, the 
number of relationships of the entire Corporate Network was significantly higher in 1998, when 
Brakes Spain reached its strategic embeddedness peak. Overall, strategic embeddedness was 
developed through the increased presence and relevance in the MNC strategic forums, which is 
shown in different patterns of relations within the MNC. 
HQ Mandate versus Subsidiary’s Autonomous Behavior 
For the subsidiary to present autonomous behavior, the HQ mandate must allow it. The 
evidence from the case presented here clearly shows that HQ allowed Brakes Spain to behave 
autonomously (see Table 2). Perhaps more important was that the subsidiary capitalized on this 
leeway, building a vast network across the MNC and with external entities. Table 4 shows that 
there was a higher density in 1998 between Brakes Spain strategic departments and the MNC 
than in 2003, illustrating a retrenchment of subsidiary behavior in its international relations. 
Between 1998 and 2003, Brakes Spain intensified the relations among its units while 
significantly decreasing  the effort to relate to other units in the MNC as the percentage of 
overall relations between Brakes Spain and Brakes or its customers decreased significantly (see 
Table 3). This insight can be summarized in the following propositions: 
Proposition 1a: Restrictive mandates from HQ are negatively associated with the subsidiary’s 
autonomous behavior.  
Proposition 1b: Autonomous behavior is positively associated with the subsidiary’s generation 
of capabilities and strategic levels of embeddedness. 
From Operational to Capability to Strategic Embeddedness 
As the subsidiary was leeway allowed to develop relationships with customers and other units 
of the MNC, Brakes Spain was first able to develop operational embeddedness, engaging in 
quality control with other units of the MNC (see Table 2). Next, the subsidiary through 
recruitment of R&D and engineering staff was able to develop its own capabilities, increasing 
its relations with the MNC capability embeddedness. This sequence suggests that constructing 
embeddedness is a process in which establishing one level of embeddedness makes possible to 
build the next level. In the case of Brakes Spain, initial operational efficiency and establishing 
a strong Internal Network led to building new capabilities and establishing a Corporate 
Network. Then, the subsidiary was able to develop Strategic Embeddedness by gaining influence 
in the overall decision making within Brakes. As the subsidiary grew into developing its own 
strategy, it gained distinctiveness within the MNC. Network data for 1998 shows that the 
External Network was more dense and with a significantly higher proportion of relations (see 
Tables 3 and 4). As data shows in Table 5, operational embeddedness led to capability 
embeddedness and then to strategic embeddedness. The argument of the model presented is that 
in order to move to one you have to have proficiency in the previous level of embeddedness. 
Conversely, as shown in Table 5, when centralization of activities was imposed, the network of 
relations was scaled back for Brakes Spain. It is significant that the number of alters in Brakes 
Spain’s network from Brakes’ HQ decreased from 12 to 9, while the relations with alters 
belonging to other MNC plants increased from 9 to 11 (see Table 4). Moreover, most of the  
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relationships to HQ’s functions came from their plant equivalents. The decreasing role of the 
Brakes Spain head office in this last phase of the study illustrates the way back to operational 
efficiency. Operational embeddedness emphasizes “operational excellence”. This term was used 
by the 1993-1998 CEO as his motto and was again reclaimed by the 2000-2003 CEO as the 
instruction to his local managers. Operational excellence is reflected in the higher importance 
of 2003 relations within Brakes Spain (77% of all relations in Table 3). Once again Brakes 
Spain was left with operational embeddedness. This observation can be summarized in the 
following propositions: 
Proposition 2a: Establishing operational embeddedness is a necessary condition for the 
subsequent achievement of capability embeddedness.  
Proposition 2b: Establishing operational embeddedness is a necessary condition for the 
subsequent achievement of strategic embeddedness.  
Proposition 2c: A restraining mandate from HQ is negatively associated with the achievement of 
capability or strategic embeddedness. 
Table 5 
Interaction of Roles of HQ and Subsidiary Determine Type of Embeddedness 
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effectiveness  Internal Low 
One of the plants is granted the status of Global 
Product Center by HQ. The reasons are: high know 
how, high dynamism between subsidiary’s units, 
control on manufacturing and training  
 
Manufactured products are designed in Germany, 
the U.K. and France. The local engineering team is 
skilled, but only in solving technical problems, not in 
design or training.  












































Increased investment in engineering, basically in 
recruiting new talent for new products. This was in 
part negotiated with HQ, but mostly Brakes Spain 
preferred to say “sorry” rather than to ask for 
permission in a highly political environment. Brakes 
Spain is relatively small, so it is not perceived as 
troublesome at HQ. 
Coupling R&D and sales, Brakes Spain is able to 
work developing product with the customer. The 
intention is to launch new products to satisfy the 
customer, maintaining excellence in operations and 
in processes. Accepted by HQ, the intention is 
realized to an extent such that Brakes Spain 






Left only with 
operational 
effectiveness 
Internal   Medium 
Centralization of engineering together with 
centralization of relationships with customers at HQ 
leaves  Brakes Spain defenseless. Joint action of 
sales and engineering is copied from Brakes Spain 
to HQ, as the best way to serve the customer and 
most employees go to HQ. 
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Levels of Embeddedness as the Subsidiary Strategy 
All in all, the evidence suggests that Brakes Spain gained distinctiveness within the MNC via 
generation of embeddedness and then, lost it by mandate of HQ (see Table 5). High and medium 
distinctiveness are associated with capability and strategic embeddedness. Network analysis 
strengthens the evidence suggesting that decline in subsidiary distinctiveness was forced 
through the loss of relations within the corporate and External Network (see Table 3). Similarly, 
the previous strategic development suggests that the mechanism used by Brakes Spain to 
develop strategy was an increase in relations. The relationships that the subsidiary developed 
with the MNC and customers were the vehicle for developing their own strategy. The next 
proposition is the synthesis of this observation.  
Proposition 3: Capability and Strategic embeddedness are positively associated with the 
subsidiary strategic distinctiveness within the MNC.  
The situation for 2003 is radically different to that of 1998, when Brakes asked the Spanish 
subsidiary to replicate its new product launch organization for the whole MNC. Evidence in 
Table 5 suggests that Brakes Spain lost its distinctiveness as it lost its capability and strategic 
embeddedness. While these two levels were present, their strategy reinforced autonomous 
behavior encouraging new product development and the search for new business. When HQ 
curtailed their strategy and enforced subsidiary compliance instead of subsidiary 
distinctiveness, the feedback did not encourage autonomous behavior. This observation is 
synthesized in proposition 4. 
Proposition 4: The acceptance of subsidiary’s level of distinctiveness by the MNC’s HQ is 
positively associated with higher levels of autonomous behavior.  
COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have developed a model of subsidiary strategy that presents embeddedness as the key driver 
for the subsidiary to generate distinctiveness within the MNC. We have also identified three 
levels of embeddedness that can create distinctiveness for the subsidiary within the MNC. Our 
results complement existing research in subsidiary strategy (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; 
Taggart, 1999; Andersson et al., 2002), which identifies the ability of the subsidiary to develop 
strategy. 
For Andersson et al. (2002) external embeddedness is critical for subsidiary strategy 
development and does have a significant impact on subsidiary performance. We complement 
their findings; we add to them the criticality of internal embeddedness. To their claim regarding 
external embeddedness, our paper adds the importance of three different levels of internal 
embeddedness to the development of subsidiary distinctiveness. 
Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) emphasize the importance of interaction between the development 
of subsidiary capabilities and HQ’s mandate in explaining subsidiary evolution. The model 
presented in this paper builds on their development by emphasizing that the subsidiary 
capability evolution flows through different levels of embeddedness, which respond not only to 
HQ’s mandate but also to the subsidiary’s autonomous behavior. Operational embeddedness 
grows parallel with the development of basic operational capabilities. The integration of the 
multinational’s worldwide operations  implies a minimum level of operational capabilities for  
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global coordination to work efficiently. When the subsidiary has achieved a certain level of 
integration, the development of strategic capabilities allows to contribute to the worldwide 
learning effort emphasized by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), increasing their level of capability 
embeddedness. As recognition grows around the MNC, the subsidiary might start to gain a 
voice in different issues, achieving a certain level of strategic influence through the 
development of strategic embeddedness. As such, the evolution of the capabilities of the 
subsidiary parallels the evolution through the three different levels of embeddedness identified 
in this paper. The model presented here also acknowledges the critical relationship between 
headquarters and subsidiary (Taggart, 1999; Andersson et al., 2005), by including it as a 
triggering element. Moreover, as the different stages of embeddedness are developed, subsidiary 
distinctiveness influences further autonomous behavior. 
The influence of the network position of firms on their performance has been widely recognized 
(Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990; Uzzi, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Håkansson and Snehota, 1998; 
Gulati et al., 2000; Rowley et al., 2000; Hung, 2002). Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) translate 
this view into the multinational context emphasizing the importance of lateral relationships 
between subsidiaries, that have been found to have a significant influence on performance 
(Subramaniam and Watson, 2006). This paper applies this view to the MNC network view   
(Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Andersson and Forsgren, 1996) identifying network embeddedness 
as the foundation on which the subsidiary can build its distinctiveness within the MNC. The 
model in this paper emphasizes that these lateral contributions can be designed in order to 
become a specialized contributor, initiating non-specified mandates. It also explains how these 
interdependencies are created and introduces a logical sequence for embeddedness evolution. 
The model presented here centers on the ability of the subsidiary to develop its own strategy, 
and in doing so, affecting MNC’s norms and, particularly, its strategy. Although the power to 
design a strategy for the subsidiary may be breed in HQ, conflicting logic or interests from the 
subsidiary may reshape both the subsidiary and the MNC strategy. Social action by the 
subsidiary is not only shaped and conditioned by the context of action, determined by HQ and 
the action of other subsidiaries, but also by the dynamic element of social action itself. If the 
subsidiary is able to exercise strategic choice by developing an active role, this proactive 
behavior may affect not only the subsidiary but may expand its effect to the whole MNC. This 
may be particularly important when the strategy promoted by the MNC endangers the existence 
of the subsidiary itself. The overall level of distinctiveness a subsidiary may be capable of 
generating will depend on how the subsidiary manages the three types of embeddedness. 
Caution must be exercised in discussing the results of the present study. First, it has been 
carried out within a Spanish context and cultural elements could be partial explanation of our 
findings. Second, Brakes’ network effect tends to be industry specific (Rowley et al., 2000), and 
a single case only addresses one industry. Third, being a single case study, conceptual 
generalization has been attempted through the model presented. Although we have used 
quantitative data to supplement our analysis, the use of qualitative data entails interpretation. 
While this approach is very powerful for developing a theory, it does not provide unequivocal 
results. Although known precautions have been taken to strengthen validity and reliability, 
further quantitative designs in future research can strengthen the framework and concepts 
presented here.  
All in all, while the literature on subsidiary strategy has traditionally value in focused on the 
role it plays within the multinational company, no work, to our knowledge, has operational zed 
the concept of embeddedness in concrete strategic and organizational issues. We introduce a 
new and critical component for subsidiary strategy. The three dimensions of embeddedness that  
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we propose correspond to three basic dimensions that result in subsidiary distinctiveness. 
Although we do not claim to reduce all components of subsidiary strategy to managing its 
embeddedness level, the concept of developing embeddedness to gain distinctiveness explains a 
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